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1. Introduction  
[Rhodes] was talking to his patient Bryan while he (Bryan) performed 
Tai-Chi-style movements. Through the window, the sun could be 
seen to be setting. Bryan spontaneously said that he was ‘setting the 
sun.’ He appeared to fully believe that he was doing this through 
moving his body. (Gipps and Rhodes 2008: 302) 
Bryan is delusional. His belief that he is able to “set the sun” and indeed doing 
so is a nice example of what is known as a bizarre delusion. It is so far out of 
the ordinary that it is apparent that something must be wrong with Bryan. 
Bizarre delusions are the most striking subset of an entire class of mental 
states, delusions, which play an important role as a diagnostic tool in psychiatry. 
Delusions are one of the marks of mental illness. But compare Bryan’s case 
with the following passage from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty:  
Men have believed that they could make rain; why should not a king 
be brought up in the belief that the world began with him? And if 
Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really 
prove his belief to be the right one? (Wittgenstein 1969: §92) 
The king’s belief is equally bizarre as Bryan’s, but for all we know the king—let 
us call him Arthur—is utterly sane. His environment is just very peculiar. 
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Chinese and Roman Emperors thought of themselves as gods. Wittgenstein 
takes Arthur’s belief to be of a special kind: it is a hinge or a certainty. Indeed, 
Bryan’s delusion and Arthur’s belief are strikingly similar on several aspects, 
even if we put aside their bizarreness for a while. In this chapter I will argue that 
this is not a mere coincidence: delusions are a kind of certainty. This 
demystifies delusions: they are simply errant cousins of a type of belief that 
everyone has. 
The key similarity is that both beliefs are extraordinarily resistant against 
contrary evidence. It is the mark of delusions that they are immune against 
contrary evidence. “Delusions are fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change 
in light of conflicting evidence.” (DSM-5 2013: 87) Similarly Arthur would not 
accept any amount of evidence, for example the discovery of ancient ruins in 
the ground. 
The only thing that might make Bryan snap out of it would be some 
transformative event, be it therapy or treatment with antipsychotics.1 Similarly, 
Wittgenstein thinks that Moore—the champion of common sense—could not 
bring Arthur to abandon his young-earth-belief by reason: “I do not say that 
Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a 
special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way.” 
(Wittgenstein 1969: §92) 
 
1 However, delusions tend to reappear when medication is laid off, e.g. (Munro 1999: 
94). 
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I consider certainties to be distinct from hinges: certainties are beliefs of which 
we are so confident that no evidence will change that belief. Hinges are a 
subclass of the class of certainties; they are so central to an agent’s belief 
system that changes in hinges would imply a wide-ranging shift in the belief 
system. Compare this also to Crispin Wright’s notion of a “cornerstone” (2004). 
John Campbell (2001) originally proposed that delusions are dysfunctional 
hinges, and generated some debate under the label of the “framework account” 
of delusions. In this chapter, I take an explicitly epistemological approach to the 
hypothesis—that is, I am less focussed on the psychiatric and therapeutic 
aspects of delusion. Rather, I am interested in what epistemology can learn 
from delusions. They constitute a breakdown of a certain type of convictions—
certainties—and the systems with which we manage them. We can learn a lot 
about what a thing is by looking at when and how it stops working. 
I will proceed by introducing and illustrating more precisely what delusions and 
certainties are. I then show in which aspects delusions resemble certainties to 
both establish their compatibility and the plausibility of the claim that delusions 
are certainties. Next, I present an argument for why we should think of 
delusions as a kind of certainty. Finally, I defend this position against different 
criticisms and I compare it to competing views. 
2. What are delusions? 
When I talk about delusions I do not mean the folk notion or the kitchen 
psychological diagnosis for some very irrational beliefs which I consider to be 
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more harmful than useful. I mean the above-mentioned symptom of mental 
illness. Delusions can have a wide range of contents. They reach from the 
banal to the bizarre as this incomplete anthology shows. (See also DSM-5 
2013: 87) 
Litigious delusion refers to beliefs that the patient has suffered some great 
injustice and must set all institutions into motion to even it out. (Munro 1999: 
130–136) Morbid jealousy is an obsessive preoccupation with a romantic 
partner’s infidelity. (Kingham and Gordon 2004) Then there is the great classic, 
delusion of persecution, colloquially known as paranoia.2 But there are also 
more peculiar delusions such as delusion of infestation, where a patient for 
example believes that their skin is crawling with insects (Munro 1999: 85–86) or 
delusions of grandeur in which the patient thinks herself to be a great or 
important person (Munro 1999: 140–142). Finally, there are bizarre delusions 
like the Capgras delusion that persons close to the patient have been replaced 
by identical doppelgängers (ICD-11 2018: MB26.0B) or the Cotard delusion that 
the patient is dead (ICD-11 2018: MB26.0A).  
I shall take the definition from the ICD-11 as a starting point for my account of 
delusions. Although I do have some misgivings about some aspects that will 
become clear in the course of this paper, I think that it is correct at its core. 
 
2 “Paranoia” was a concept specified by Emil Kraepelin in the late 19th Century to 
designate what is nowadays known as delusional disorder. (Munro 1999: 11–13) I shall 
not be using the term to avoid confusion. 
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Delusion: A belief that is demonstrably untrue or not shared by 
others, usually based on incorrect inference about external reality. 
The belief is firmly held with conviction and is not, or is only briefly, 
susceptible to modification by experience or evidence that 
contradicts it. The belief is not ordinarily accepted by other members 
or the person's culture or subculture (i.e., it is not an article of 
religious faith). (ICD-11 2018: MB26.0)3 
3. What are certainties and hinges?  
Meanwhile, there is no ICD for epistemology and consequently no official 
definition of hinges and certainties. Indeed, the question is quite contested (cf. 
Coliva and Moyal-Sharrock: 2016). I will therefore argue for my own fairly 
minimal definitions of certainty and hinge.4 
(C) A belief that P is a certainty for an agent S if and only if S holds it with 
such a high degree of conviction that no other belief or evidence would change 
the degree of conviction with which it is held. 
(C) is a notion of psychological certainty that I take to be fairly common-sense. 
Certainty here is characterised by what claims of being (absolutely) certain 
 
3 Compare this to the DSM-5 definition (2013: 819). 
4 Note that it is not my goal to do an exercise in Wittgenstein-exegesis, examining what 
the author of On Certainty would have argued about delusions. Rather, I take 
certainties and hinges to be independently interesting epistemological phenomena.  
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mean. I am for example certain that Santa Claus does not exist—no amount of 
evidence would convince me otherwise. This certainty is internalist. I do not 
take certainty to be factive, a kind of knowledge-gold as in (Beddor: 2020). If I 
come across contrary evidence to such a certainty, I will reject the evidence as 
either false or misleading.5  
Some certainties are about propositions that are so fundamental and central in 
our belief system that they inform the structure of all other beliefs. They 
influence what counts as evidence for what, and what sort of things there are. 
These certainties are called hinges, because they are the fix points or axes 
around which the rest of our belief system rotates. Danièle Moyal-Sharrock 
(2004: 52, 72) also makes this distinction but calls the certainties of (C) 
“subjective certainties”, while hinges or hinge certainties as defined in (H) below 
are the non-propositional content of “objective certainties”:  
(H) A certainty that P is a hinge certainty or a hinge for an agent S if and only 
if a change in the conviction whether P would imply changes for many other 
beliefs of S; be they changes in their evidential support, or changes in the 
nature of the entities and properties contained in the beliefs. 
For example, ‘the world began at my birth’ is Arthur’s hinge certainty. If Arthur 
stopped believing this hinge, this would have far-reaching implications about the 
 
5 Certainty would correspond to a credence of 1 which can never be updated to <1, at 
least in classical Bayesian calculus.   
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age of most objects and people. Ruins in the ground suddenly would become 
evidence for their being older rather than equally old as Arthur. And ‘being a 
grandmother’ would undergo a profound shift in meaning, given that there 
would now be women who actually gave birth to Arthur’s parents. 
As mentioned, hinges have been introduced by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his On 
Certainty (1969). Wittgenstein observed, how we just take some things for 
granted, we will not question them. Imagine you heard that bunny rabbits were 
vicious beasts and that they’d attack and kill you if you turned your back on 
them. You would reject that claim. You are certain that bunnies are harmless 
animals. Now, consider how you would react to seeing a bunny rabbit viciously 
attacking and harming someone. You would refuse to believe that that was a 
bunny rabbit—you’re certain that they are too small and weak to do that. You 
would think you’re hallucinating or being tricked. Arguably, it is a hinge about 
leporids and thereby bunnies, that they are not vicious and dangerous animals. 
Hinge certainties can fulfil this function because they are certainties. 
The interesting thing about hinges is that we cannot do without them. Our 
epistemic households necessarily have loose ends—we cannot support 
everything with evidence. That is the lesson we can and should draw from 
sceptical arguments. Hinges tie in these loose ends. They fix them as certain 
and beyond evidence. There are hinges at all levels: logical axioms, principles 
of metaphysics and physics, rules of language, ideas about what and who we 
are. 
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They are the frame within or the background in front of which we interpret our 
evidence. The frame gives us starting points from which to deal with our 
evidence and it is not responsive to the evidence. Scepticism tries to undermine 
our knowledge by showing that nothing supports our hinges, i.e. the frame itself. 
Hinge-epistemology argues that this is misunderstanding how our epistemology 
works—already the notion of evidential support only makes sense within an 
evidence-independent frame that fixes these evidential relations. The frame 
holds, because we are certain of it.  
Note that this is a strongly internalist notion of hinges and certainties, it focuses 
exclusively on the agent’s point of view. Note also, that my notion of hinges is 
highly descriptive and thereby minimal: there is no normativity or teleology 
involved in it. Hinges and certainties are simply an essential feature of belief 
systems as we possess them. They play an analogous role to axioms and 
theorems in a logic—it leaves the normative status of the axiom outside of the 
logic undetermined.  
Hinge-epistemology as a field has only recently taken off. Nevertheless, it has 
already given rise to a thriving literature. (e.g. Moyal-Sharrock 2004; Wright 
2004; Coliva and Moyal-Sharrock 2016; Pritchard 2016) The main point about 
certainties and hinges for this paper is their functional role: they are 
independent of evidence and cannot be dislodged by any amount of reasoning 
or evidence. 
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4. Does one believe delusions and hinges? 
I have defined certainties as beliefs. There are arguments about whether beliefs 
are essentially sensitive to evidence—there may be an epistemic state that is 
subject to such restrictions, but I will operate with a broad notion of ‘belief’ or 
doxastic state. I am committed to what is known as epistemicism in hinge-
epistemology and as doxasticism in the debate about delusions, namely the 
thesis that these states are a kind of belief. I do not wish to delve into this 
argument and leave the defence of the assumption to others. (Wright 2004; 
Bayne and Pacherie 2005; Kusch 2016) 
Still, in this chapter I do rely on both delusions and hinges being beliefs or 
doxastic states, therefore I will nevertheless explain why I treat both delusions 
and certainties as such. By a ‘doxastic state’ I mean a representational state 
whose content is taken to be actually the case. That is, it is essential for 
doxastic states that the subject accepts their content to be true. Clearly, neither 
delusions nor hinges are like more regular beliefs that are acquired by relying 
on evidence—nevertheless both represent things being or behaving in a certain 
way and they involve an endorsement of this being so. This means that they are 
doxastic states or beliefs in the broad sense.6 
 
6 Bayne and Pacherie (2005) also point to beliefs’ distinctive phenomenology, however 
that is only the case with occurrent beliefs. 
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Additionally, as mentioned, I am interested in the epistemology of delusions. 
Treating delusions and certainties as doxastic states straightforwardly makes 
them epistemic states and subject to epistemic constraints. Meanwhile, if we 
took them to be some other kind of mental state, it would take a considerable 
amount of conceptual manoeuvring to examine their epistemological role, if it is 
possible at all. 
Finally, this view is in a sense more light-weight. It takes a certain amount of 
presuppositions about how our mind works and what beliefs are to get the result 
that evidence-insensitive states cannot be doxastic. Meanwhile, it is quite 
common to see delusions and certainties naively described as ‘beliefs’ where 
arguably their doxasticity is at issue. Note specifically, that the DSM and the 
ICD ascribe belief and that we naively ascribe beliefs with certainties and 
hinges. We will touch upon doxasticism again later on. 
5. How do delusions resemble certainties? 
The thesis of this paper is that delusions are defective certainties. Is this 
plausible at all? I will begin by mentioning some of the striking similarities 
between delusions and certainties. Consider the ICD-11 definition of delusions 
again: 
A belief that is demonstrably untrue or not shared by others, usually 
based on incorrect inference about external reality. The belief is 
firmly held with conviction and is not, or is only briefly, susceptible to 
modification by experience or evidence that contradicts it. The belief 
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is not ordinarily accepted by other members or the person's culture or 
subculture (i.e., it is not an article of religious faith). (ICD-11 2018: 
MB 26.0) 
This looks like an individualist subset of the definition of certainties that I gave: 
(C) A belief that P is a certainty for an agent S if and only if S holds it with 
such a degree of conviction that no other belief or evidence would change the 
degree of conviction with which it is held. 
That is, from the subject’s egocentric point of view, delusions and certainties 
just look the same. Both are beliefs which cannot be influenced by the 
environment. If the subject gains some evidence that seems to contradict a 
certainty or a delusion, then she will reinterpret the evidence as somehow 
misleading. The evidence is defeated by the very fact that the evidence appears 
to contradict a certainty or a delusion:  
The distinction between a delusion and a strongly held idea is 
sometimes difficult to make and depends in part on the degree of 
conviction with which the belief is held despite clear or reasonable 
contradictory evidence regarding its veracity. (DSM-5 2013: 87) 
There are differences between my account of certainties and the ICD-11 
definition though. First there is the bit that delusions are demonstrably false. 
Delusions do not necessarily need to be false. The FBI may keep even the 
paranoiac under surveillance, someone may have a delusion of infestation and 
still catch scabies.  
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The other difference is the ICD’s individualism—the definition claims that 
disagreement is essential for delusions. I think that disagreement is at best a 
diagnostic tool; but it cannot be an essential trait of delusions. Because 
necessary disagreement would exclude the possibility of groups of individuals 
happening to share the same delusion even by accident.7 Additionally, the 
definition in this form requires disagreement—why could I not suffer from 
delusions, if I lived in complete social isolation? I therefore argue that the 
incompatibility with the environment’s belief set is more a heuristic than 
characteristic of delusion. 
You might think that the possibility of groups sharing a delusion is quite far-
fetched and would never occur in reality. However, delusions are contagious—
they can be shared like certainties. We know of folie à deux or “induced 
delusional disorder” (ICD-10 2016: F24)8, where a primary delusional patient 
 
7 If we sent a group of patients suffering from a delusion of infestation on holiday 
somewhere in isolation, this would not make them any less delusional. 
8 The diagnosis has been subsumed under the label of “Delusional Disorder” with 
others to simplify the diagnoses in the DSM-5 and ICD-11. (Biedermann and 
Fleischhacker 2016: 352) Note that delusional disorder itself is treated as a sort of 
leftover category from schizophrenia and transient psychosis. However there is still 
research on the topic of induced delusions, e.g. (Vigo et al. 2019; Jerrom et al. 2020). 
There is an important caveat: transmitted delusions may be indicative of independent 
mental health issues in the secondary patient. 
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transmits his or her delusion to a secondary patient, who did not at first harbour 
any delusions but is emotionally close to the primary patient. Usually, the 
primary and the secondary patient are socially isolated. The secondary patient 
adopts the delusion and can become as stable in his or her induced delusion as 
the primary patient. Often the secondary patient is a child who adopts his or her 
parent’s delusion.  
Some psychiatrists believe that cults represent cases of induced delusion in 
groups. It is hypothesised that cult leaders often suffer from delusions. The 
social isolation of cult structures as well as the strong emotional bonds within a 
cult may then lead to the spread of the delusion. (Munro 1999: 186) The ICD-
definition would explicitly exclude even the possibility of this phenomenon—I 
therefore take its social dimension to only function as a diagnostic tool.  
Folie à deux also shows another striking parallel between delusions and 
certainties: the way that they are adopted. We tend to adapt our outlook on the 
world to the one of people close to us; we establish a common ground—
especially as children. That is, we adopt others’ certainties and hinges without 
evidence —this is how we learn. Folie à deux would then just be a delusion 
hijacking the very natural mechanism by which we epistemically conform to our 
immediate environment. 
Taking the insensitivity to evidence as a starting point, John Campbell (2001) 
has proposed a hinge view of delusion. His “framework approach” however is 
less influenced by epistemology than by reflections on philosophy of language. 
Campbell tries to preserve the delusional subject’s rationality and agency—a 
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shift in hinges would explain the patient’s beliefs and the behaviour that 
appears irrational to us. 
However, according to Campbell, what comes along with this shift in hinges is a 
deep shift in language and world view. The delusional subject, qua delusional 
hinge, changes language—semantics and grammar shift along with the hinge. 
Consequently, the appearance that we use the same language as the patient is 
merely superficial. To someone with delusions of persecution ‘following me’ 
must mean something completely different—similarly ‘love’ must mean 
something else to someone with erotomanic delusions. 
Campbell’s framework view has been rightly criticised for this radical 
conclusion. (Bayne and Pacherie 2004) It would hardly be helpful to consider a 
delusional patient as someone to whom we have lost all means of access and 
with whom communication is a mere illusion. Indeed, it would be deeply 
problematic—the alienation would be total and all hope for both understanding 
and therapeutic treatment except by drugs would have to be given up! Only by 
self-inducing the delusion, i.e. adopting their hinge and losing grip of our 
community’s language, could we reach the delusional patient.9 
I believe that delusions are misguided certainties, not hinges. They therefore 
can remain much more superficial and conservative. The delusional subject 
 
9 Clearly, it can be difficult to communicate with such patients—but this is only partially 
due to their having delusions and also owned to emotional volatility and the fact that 
patients may easily be distracted. 
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simply adopts a few, maybe only one, additional certainty on top of all the 
hinges and certainties they already possessed before.10 That is the subject’s 
world view remains essentially preserved—she is simply now certain of one 
particular thing where this particular conviction may be emotionally highly 
charged and therefore a constant issue due to the syndrome.  
That is, the patient’s language remains essentially the same as does her world 
view: delusional subjects are usually aware that their delusion is extraordinary, 
they do not expect to be believed just like that. Additionally, if patients are 
asked how they would react to someone else making the same delusional 
claims as them they may recognise those to be delusional. (Bell, Halligan and 
Ellis 2003: 4; Bayne and Pacherie 2004: 9) This indicates that they haven’t 
transformed their entire world-view and language. 
However, there may be space for Campbell’s analysis of delusions. If I am 
correct that delusions are certainties and hinges are a subset of the set of 
certainties, then it seems clearly within the remit of possibility that a delusion 
becomes a hinge. This would mean that the subject’s delusional certainty would 
have far-reaching implications in her belief system, although not necessarily as 
extreme as predicted by Campbell. There are delusions that may satisfy this 
hinge criterion: some delusions are considered to be bizarre due to their 
impossible-seeming content. (ICD-11 2018: MB 26.0) Namely, it seems a 
 
10 Obviously, if for example a schizophrenia progresses the patient might accumulate 
delusions.  
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plausible hypothesis that bizarre delusions would be delusions caused by 
delusional hinges, while non-bizarre delusions are mere certainties. A version of 
this reading has been proposed in (Klee, 2004). 
6. Why delusions are certainties 
All of this, at best, plausibilises the contention that delusions are certainties. But 
there is more than just prima facie similarity. My argument for the view that 
delusions are certainties runs as follows. 
P1 Delusions are doxastic states. 
P2 Delusions are not controlled by evidence. 
P3 Certainties are doxastic states that are not controlled by 
evidence. 
P4 Apart from certainties there is no other class of doxastic 
states that are not controlled by evidence and that is compatible with 
subsuming delusions. 
Therefore 
C5 Delusions are a subset of the class of certainties. 
The first three premises are relatively unproblematic. P1 and P2 simply arise 
from the ICD-11 definition of delusion, while P3 follows from my definition of 
certainties. As mentioned above, P1 and the doxastic status of certainties in P3 
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are somewhat controversial—however I will take this for granted. I.e. I will 
ignore the larger debate about doxasticism and epistemicism. 
One might counter against P2 that delusional subjects clearly take certain 
things to be evidence for their delusion; the DSM-5 also states that delusions 
are based on inference. In delusions of reference for example each newspaper 
headline is taken to be further evidence for the delusion that the newspapers 
write about the patient. Similarly, in delusions of persecution, patients interpret 
patterns such as how the cars are parked in a street as secret messages 
between their persecutors; they interpret it as evidence for their persecution.  
However, these examples illustrate that the evidence for the delusional 
acceptance already itself relies on the delusion in order to function as evidence. 
Take the example of a patient inferring from seeing a row of marble tables that 
the world is ending. (Campbell 2001: 95) Without some delusional certainty, this 
bizarre inference could not be made. This is the very same sense in which 
certainties are not controlled by evidence—they are what makes certain things 
into evidence in the first place. Without the given certainties, there would be no 
evidence for them.11  
Clearly P4 is the most questionable premise of my argument. I will therefore 
have to defend this claim more extensively. There are several ways to deny P4: 
 
11 An exception would be delusions that are partially supported by hallucinations. But 
also interpreting, for example, acoustic hallucinations as alien radio emissions would 
require a delusional certainty. 
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either one claims that delusions form their own class of doxastic state or one 
argues that there is some other kind of doxastic state to which delusions 
belong. I find both alternatives lacking. 
I have two objections against the claim that delusions form their own class: first, 
it is not very parsimonious. Given that hinge epistemology and the notion of 
certainty I presented have independent standing, why would we need to create 
an entire separate doxastic class for delusions? What distinguishes delusions 
so much from certainties that we would need a separate class? And what do we 
gain in terms of explanatory power by treating delusions as a class apart? It 
would just be restating that delusions exist. 
Second, I do not think that delusions are the right kind of thing to form its own 
class of doxastic states. Delusions are epistemological defects—something 
went wrong with a subject’s epistemology when they hold a delusion. It seems 
odd to grant a defect its own class just in virtue of its defectivity. A defect always 
depends on some function that is not fulfilled—without some function, no defect. 
The only option to treat delusions as its own kind of doxastic state would then 
be to claim that they constitute the class of defective doxastic states, but this 
cannot be: there are many more kinds of defective doxastic states, most 
generally false beliefs, but also self-deception or the results of sloppy 
reasoning. There seems to be no positive reason to grant delusions a status 
independent of certainties. 
The other objection against P4 is that delusions belong to another class of 
doxastic states that are not controlled by evidence, but which are no certainties. 
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I shall consider three alternatives: the first is that delusions are derailed 
assumptions, the second that delusions are misinterpreted imaginations, and 
the third that delusions are uncontrolled memories. 
Assumptions are evidence-insensitive in the sense that they are adopted 
without any need for evidence. They bridge a lack of evidence we sometimes 
have, but where we are forced to decide. However, assumptions are not 
immune to evidence in every sense: neither would we adopt nor maintain an 
assumption against which we have defeating evidence or against which 
defeating evidence has come up. This distinguishes assumptions from 
delusions—given a delusion, contrary evidence is itself defeated. Delusions do 
not bridge missing information, they are independent of other information. 
The second option is that the delusions are a kind of imagining. This account 
has been suggested by Currie (2000), taking evidence of how schizophrenic 
patients appear to process information. The imaginings in question, I guess, are 
the sort of thing we do in thought experiments: “suppose that an articulate voice 
were heard in the clouds, […] that the words spoken from the sky were not only 
meaningful but conveyed some instruction” as for example David Hume (1993: 
54) suggested. This way of imagining isolates the imagined proposition from 
contrary evidence—in that sense it is insensitive to evidence. 
Currie (2000: 174–175) suggests that delusions arise because the subject 
cannot distinguish between her imaginings and her beliefs. That is, she will treat 
both states in the same way. I do not think that this diagnosis of delusions holds 
up. Imaginings are isolated from evidence because their content is not 
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endorsed as true. Currie argues that in delusion imaginings become more 
similar to beliefs. Note that Currie is taken to be a non-doxasticist—that is the 
orthodox reading of his proposal goes against P1 of my argument and falls 
outside the scope of this paper. For a careful critique of the non-doxasticist 
approach to imagination as delusion, please refer to Bayne and Pacherie’s 
(2005). 
I believe that delusions essentially involve an endorsement of their content as 
true. Indeed, their truth is felt with great intensity—that is part of what gives 
delusions such power over the patient. Take an example: if I suffer the delusion 
that someone is trying to poison me, then I take there to be a real danger that 
my food or drink will kill me. I am actually scared of what my food might do to 
me and I act accordingly—as can be seen for example from Kurt Gödel’s fate. 
He did not merely pretend or imagine that he would be poisoned, he genuinely 
feared that it would happen. If imaginings became such states, they would not 
be imaginings anymore—Currie (2000: 178) concedes this point. Imagination 
can only be an aetiological source of delusions, not delusion itself. 
As mentioned, imaginings are evidentially isolated because we do not endorse 
their content as true. If we lose this non-endorsement, then the imagining would 
lose its evidential isolation. Arguably, this representational state would even 
stop being an imagining and instead become more of a consideration of a 
proposition or if loss of non-endorsement means endorsement, an irrational 
belief.  
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A further problem with the imagining as delusion approach is that, to my 
knowledge, delusional subjects do not lose their ability to imagine things.12 We 
imagine things of all sorts all the time. If a delusional patient confused his 
imaginings with beliefs, his delusion would become truly florid. They’d be 
‘believing’ one thing now and the contrary a few seconds later, it would be a 
true kaleidoscope or firework of ‘beliefs’. There may be syndromes like that, but 
this hardly yields a sufficiently general account of delusions. I will therefore 
disregard imaginings as an account for delusions. 
The third option originates in the psychiatric literature: delusions are false 
memories that have taken hold. (Gibbs and David 2003; Moritz and Woodward 
2006) Apparently, delusional patients have a lower evidential threshold for 
when to accept or reject a belief. This may lead to patients’ misremembering 
imaginings or confabulations as real. This delusional memory is then reinforced 
through emotionally facilitated recall.  
This account is somewhat orthogonal to the epistemological approach—in a 
sense any belief that is not based on current perceptions or inferences is a 
memory. This would hardly be informative epistemologically speaking. Indeed, 
Gibbs and David argue that delusion is grounded in episodic memories that are 
not controlled for whether they were actual events. (Gibbs and David 2003: 
171–172) 
 
12 Maybe patients with schizophrenia do, but schizophrenic delusion is a subset of the 
field of delusion. 
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I am sceptical of this approach. First, if there is a lowered threshold for 
accepting some idea as true in delusion—why does the patient not continually 
change her memories and beliefs? Low evidential thresholds would, it seems, 
rather have a destabilising effect on our belief system than the doxastic 
ossification that we can observe in delusion. After all, delusions are 
characterised by that they are not dismissed but instead that they are 
maintained against all evidence. What would make them so special? The simple 
fact that they happen to be more frequently recalled? Under any circumstance, 
nothing in this account of delusions explains why they are immune against 
evidence and reasoning.  
The second problem is that I am not sure whether delusions always are the kind 
of beliefs that can be grounded in episodic memories. What sort of memory 
would be at the bottom of a delusion of reference? Presumably, only few 
delusional subjects have actually had a news item about themselves, and even 
if so how would a single memory lead to the patient’s belief that all news items 
are about them? Or what about the admittedly more peculiar case of Cotard 
syndrome? Cotard patients, to my knowledge, do not report that they remember 
dying. In sum, I think that memories, however imaginary or outlandish, cannot 
have the right kind of content in order to constitute generalised delusions. What 
may be is that delusions are supported and reinforced by distorted memories—
but the memories are not the delusions themselves or their immediate source. 
I would not know what other avenues there might be to deny P4. Meanwhile, all 
of the above-mentioned alternative suggestions to classify delusions were 
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unsatisfactory. Any other account of delusions would have to be dealt with in a 
similar manner. A strategy I didn’t take is to explain how some alternative 
solution is, itself, an instance of a certainty. That is, certain suggestions made to 
deny P4 might actually themselves confirm P4. 
7. How do delusional certainties remain confined? 
Bayne and Pacherie have made a careful critique of Campbell’s (2001) 
framework account of delusions. One of the objections they make against 
Campbell might gain traction against my proposal: delusions frequently are 
“encapsulated”. That is, the delusional subject does not draw the appropriate 
conclusions from his or her delusion or always behave as if it were the case. 
Instead, it remains quite insulated and does not structure the patient’s entire 
thinking and acting—something that hinges arguably would do, given their role 
as the fundamental presuppositions for epistemic and practical agency. (Bayne 
and Pacherie 2004: 9) 
 I already distinguished between hinges and certainties. Notably, I argued 
that delusions are certainties but not necessarily hinges. Certainties may remain 
fairly isolated beliefs. They do not need to have far-reaching consequences—an 
advantage over Campbell’s view that I already hinted at above. Certainties may 
not always be salient, thus you may be implicitly certain of something13 without 
being aware of all of its consequences. This differentiates certainties from 
 
13 Just as you may implicitly believe something. 
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hinges, which by their nature will influence the content of other beliefs. Thus the 
restricted nature of certainties may explain the encapsulation of delusions. 
I also considered the possibility that there may also be delusional hinge 
certainties as proposed by Campbell (2001) and Klee (2004), which would then 
yield bizarre delusions. How might one counter Bayne and Pacherie’s (2004) 
criticism in that case? I guess one would have to argue that delusional hinges 
are remarkably specific in their content. Delusions usually ascribe some 
singular property to some particular object or a restrained class of objects: my 
body/an organ is X in somatic delusions, I am not alive in Cotard’s, my thoughts 
are being manipulated with thought insertion. Consequently, they tend to only 
have consequences in relation to that specific content. Possibly, delusional 
hinges are in fact more specific in their content than a patient’s utterances 
would seem to imply. To take the example of Cotard’s this would mean that 
‘dead’ has shifted in its meaning given the patient’s delusional hinge, while 
other beliefs remain unchanged.  
This however contravenes the notion of ‘hinge’ as defined in (H). A possible 
solution might be to consider ‘hinge’ to be a graded notion. The more 
implications a certainty has, the ‘hingier’ it is. Delusions about too consequential 
hinges would imply undiagnosable, utter alienation. 
Encapsulation is then explained by the fact that delusional hinges and 
certainties frequently seem to be simply planted on top of a patient’s otherwise 
intact belief system. These delusional certainties do not replace much, except 
for certainties whose direct negation they are such as ‘I am alive’ in Cotard’s. 
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That is, most of the delusional patient’s epistemic structure will actually be 
preserved and still guide them in many respects. Encapsulation would arise 
from the manner in which patients attempt to integrate their delusional certainty 
or hinge into their otherwise intact world-view. 
8. Where do delusions go wrong? 
I have argued that delusions are somehow defective certainties, but my 
argument left open what makes them defective. The traits that the ICD-11 
proposes as characteristic of delusions won’t do: neither do delusions need to 
be false, nor is immunity to evidence and reasoning exclusive to delusions. Also 
the disagreement between a delusional subject and her environment is more 
diagnostic than definitory—entire groups may be delusional or individuals may 
harbour a delusion that is accepted by their environment. The DSM recognises 
this difficulty by pointing out that delusions and firmly held beliefs may be hard 
to distinguish. (DSM-5 2018: 87) 
What other avenues are there to distinguish delusions from other certainties? 
One suggestion has the vice of being remarkably uninformative but possesses 
the virtue of being probably true: the aetiology of how the delusion was adopted 
and is maintained. Although there is no tell-tale evidence of what goes wrong in 
delusions neurologically speaking, there is some atypicality. (Kunert, Norra and 
Hoff 2007) This suggestion is unhelpful in several senses. A philosopher stating 
that a neurologist ought to be able to find something won’t help anyone. But 
also epistemologically speaking, this would be a capitulation—we ought to be 
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able to say more than that a patient is delusional if and only if her brain is not 
working as it should. After all, we take the delusion itself as evidence for that. It 
is circular as a characterisation, but probably true because there may very well 
be some neurological atypicality that coincides with delusional beliefs. 
Additionally, anti-psychotics are a tested, successful treatment for delusions—
thus neurological mechanisms appear to play a role in the formation of 
delusions. 
A more interesting differentiation is that of functionality. We possess certainties 
and hinges because they enable us to act and think—they guarantee our 
practical and epistemic agency, that is their function. Delusions reduce our 
agency: they hinder us from pursuing practical and theoretical projects, they 
distract us from what is at hand and so on. Delusions may be of the same 
doxastic type as certainties, but they fail to fulfil their functional or epistemic 
role. To make a medical metaphor: delusions are dysfunctional certainties just 
as leukaemia cells are dysfunctional leukocytes.  
A specific corollary of this function-account would be that delusions are 
dysfunctional in that they are harmful to the subject and his or her environment, 
while regular hinges are there to keep us out of harm’s way. Clearly, also 
regular certainties can have harmful consequences, for example sexism and 
racism may be grounded in certainties, but delusional certainties are much 
more immediately harmful. In cases of Capgras for example, patients are much 
more frequently violent than healthy subjects. (Bayne and Pacherie 2004: 6) 
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An admittedly speculative difference between delusional and regular certainties 
may be that delusional certainties express emotions. The content of most 
delusions seems to channel deep-seated fears (of poisoning, infestation, social 
exclusion) or hopes (grandeur, romantic delusions). I would guess that 
delusional beliefs anchor themselves because their content is correlated with 
deeply felt emotions. This does not imply that each mention or elaboration of 
the delusion will cause these emotions—it may very well be that delusions can 
also detach themselves from their emotional growing ground. Under any 
circumstance, regular certainties do not seem to express emotions as strongly. 
One exception may be moral certainties, if you are an expressivist. 
9. An alternative framework account 
John Campbell’s framework theory of delusion has not been the only one. 
Rhodes and Gipps (2008) have proposed a very interesting alternative 
framework account. Instead of arguing that delusions are positive certainties, 
they suggest that they are the symptom of missing hinges. Indeed, often we 
recognise delusions by their bizarreness—and bizarreness of a belief arguably 
arises when we could not see how someone would believe that. That is, a belief 
appears as bizarre if it goes against our standing hinges. Consequently, a 
delusional subject must be lacking those hinges. For example, Bryan from the 
opening of this paper clearly lacks the certainty that we cannot influence the 
sun by simply moving our body. We recognise delusion because it is 
incompatible with the hinges we possess. (Rhodes and Gipps 2008: 300–301) 
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This approach generates similar difficulties as Campbell’s: delusional subjects 
become absolutely inaccessible to us. The fact that they do not share our 
hinges leads to a completely different world-view that is deeply incompatible to 
ours—a delusional subject should consequently not be able to recognise how 
extraordinary their claims are, something they occasionally do. As said, Rhodes 
and Gipps argue that the divergent framework is what makes delusion 
diagnosable, but as Bortolotti rightly points out, hinge beliefs are not set in 
stone, for example they change through time. (Bortolotti 2011: 81–82) I.e. not 
everyone disagreeing about our framework is delusional. Additionally, there are 
very ordinary, “pedestrian” (Klee 2004), delusions that seem not to be caused 
by missing hinges. 
On a different note, nothing in Rhodes and Gipps’ approach explains why 
delusions are immune to all sorts of contrary evidence or reasoning. It only 
explains why we cannot reach delusional subjects and convince them: because 
they do not share the certainties we would use to convince them. Meanwhile 
this does not explain why their delusions are so fixated, and as Bortolotti points 
out, from missing certainties we would expect delusions to be flourishing all 
over the place. (Bortolotti 2011: 83) I therefore do not think that missing hinges 
explain delusions.  
10. Conclusion 
What are then delusions to the epistemologist? They often seem like deeply 
irrational beliefs—so irrational that some have denied that they even are beliefs. 
29   
 
I have taken a different approach: I argued that delusions are certainties, 
something that all of us possess. Given that we understand how certainties 
work, we can extrapolate how delusional subjects deal with their delusion. They 
take their delusion to be certain. Anything that seems contradictory to it will be 
brushed aside or if they are confronted with a contradiction, this will generate 
considerable resistance and discomfort, i.e. cognitive dissonance. We 
experience the same if our standing certainties are put into question. Thus 
delusions are nothing profoundly mysterious, they do not render patients utterly 
alien. Rather, some neural or other cognitive defect makes them be absolutely 
certain of something. 
In the other direction, classifying delusions as certainties puts the latter category 
under scrutiny. If certainties as a class contains both the hinges on which 
algebra is built and the delusion that I am President of the US, then we need to 
pay careful attention to certainties. It raises the question which certainties are 
acceptable, and which are not. What are the criteria for warranted certainties 
and how do we recognise a certainty as warranted? Additionally, we may 
wonder whether there are certainties, with a non-pathological aetiology that are 
as problematic as delusions. Some instances of folie à deux may belong to this 
problematic category.  
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